The increasing amount of personal data is raising serious issues in the context of privacy, security, and data ownership. Entities whose data are being collected can benefit from mechanisms to manage the parties that can access their data and to audit who has accessed their data. Consent management systems address these issues. We present Consentio, a scalable consent management system based on the Hyperledger Fabric permissioned blockchain. The data management challenge we address is to ensure high throughput and low latency of endorsing data access requests and granting or revoking consent. Experimental results show that our system can handle as many as 6,000 access requests per second, allowing it to scale to very large deployments. *Equal contribution by both authors.
INTRODUCTION
Data volumes have been growing exponentially: there are now 3.7 billion individuals with access to the Internet, generating 2.5 quintillion bytes of data every day 1 . The increasing amount of data being collected and analyzed, especially personal data, is raising serious issues in the context of privacy, security, and data ownership. These issues have been recognized, for example, by the recent EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which requires organizations consuming private data to obtain consent from the individuals whose data are being collected.
We illustrate the broad need for consent in accessing private data by considering three different contexts. First, in the area of healthcare, personal health data such as medical histories, vital signs, and lab test results are collected by hospitals, wearables, health-tracking applications, and assisted living systems. The data may be shared with various healthcare professionals to provide care or to participate in research studies [35] . However, these entities should only be able to view personal data with a patient's explicit consent. Second, a great deal of personal data are collected by online and mobile apps, and often shared with third parties: e.g., emails, web browsing and search histories, location data. Recent developments such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal [23] show that users have little control over how their online data are used or shared. A data-access process that includes user consent could have averted or at least minimized this privacy breach. Finally, smart cities are collecting potentially sensitive data through street cameras and smart electricity meters. For example, smart meter data are sent to utility companies for billing, but individuals may want to share their smart meter data with analytics services to help reduce their bills, motivating energy data sharing platforms such as Green Button 2 . Without a consent management mechanism, users may not be willing to upload their data to such platforms.
In these applications, individuals whose data are being collected should be able to decide who can access their personal data and audit who has accessed their personal data. Ideally, consent management systems (CMSs) should provide this functionality. Recent work suggests that blockchains are ideal for managing consent in a decentralized and verifiable manner [12, 15, 39, 40] . A blockchain is a distributed and tamper-proof transaction log that is agreed on and replicated among the participating entities, which do not necessarily trust each other. Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2007 [28] , blockchain technologies have grown beyond cryptocurrencies into distributed ledgers that record financial contracts and track the provenance of assets [20] , among many other applications. In consent management, a blockchain transaction corresponds to an individual's granting or withdrawing of consent to share data with a particular third party, or a third party's request to obtain access to private data. Individuals may thus submit transactions to specify who can access their data and can audit the blockchain to find out who was granted access to their data.
While the idea to use a blockchain for consent management is not new, most prior work in this area is not only domain-specific but also lacks implementation details. As a result, it remains unclear if a blockchain can be the basis for a scalable CMS. To fill this gap, we make the following contributions.
(1) CMS design: We present Consentio, a general and scalable CMS with a blockchain back end, mapping consent operations to blockchain transactions. (2) CMS implementation: We implement Consentio using Hyperledger Fabric [2] , a state-of-the-art permissioned blockchain 3 . Our solution is implemented in Hyperledger Fabric using smart contracts, which are essentially blockchain versions of stored procedures. (3) CMS world state design: To speed up transaction processing and increase transaction throughput, Fabric maintains a world state key-value store. The world state is essentially a materialized view corresponding to the current state of the entities whose transactions are stored on the blockchain. It is not obvious what world state should mean in the context of consent management. We address this data management challenge by (a) examining the space of possible key-value world state designs for consent management and (b) proposing a design that ensures high throughput and low latency of endorsing and revoking consent. Experimental results using a Fabric cluster show that Consentio can handle as many as 6,000 access requests/s and scales well with the number of nodes used to endorse transactions.
We believe that a novel aspect of our solution over prior work is that it "does more with less." Specifically, Hyperledger Fabric uses a simple key-value store to store world state, rather than relational database system that supports SQL. Yet, we demonstrate that an efficient and scalable CMS can be built using Fabric.
Note that like any other CMS, Consentio only manages users' permission settings for data access and endorses third-party requests to access private data (details of CMS goals and functionality are in Section 2). Thus, when it approves a request to access data, it effectively gives the requesting entity a key to obtain the data from some data store (and maintains a record of this transaction). Managing these data stores in a trusted fashion is an orthogonal problem that we do not address. Furthermore, after obtaining the desired data, the requesting entity is trusted not to share the data with unauthorized parties. Again, we do not address this problem, though we note that it can be resolved using well-known mechanisms such as data watermarking [30] .
The structure of this paper is as follows. We introduce CMS functionality and use cases in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the high-level design of Consentio and justify the use of a permissioned blockchain. We then discuss implementation and optimization details in Hyperledger Fabric in Section 4. We present experimental results in Section 5, and discuss related work in Section 6. We conclude with directions for future work in Section 7.
CONSENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: DEFINITIONS AND GOALS
In this section, we discuss the participating entities, functionality, and example use cases of a Consent Management System (CMS). We begin by defining consent concepts and entities, using standard terminology from the consent management and role-based access control literature [4, 32] .
• An Individual, also referred to as a Data Subject, is a person whose data are being collected. • A Resource is a subset of an individual's data of the same type, e.g., a time series of blood pressure measurements, or demographic information such as date of birth or gender. • A Data Generator is an entity that produces data, e.g., a hospital or a smart meter system, and stores this data in a Data Store. • A Data Consumer, also referred to as a Data Processor, is an entity that may request access to private data (from the data store) to perform Data Analysis. • Data consumers are grouped into Roles; a given data consumer may be assigned multiple roles. For example, a doctor at hospital X may be assigned the roles of "Cancer researcher" and/or "Hospital X staff". • A Watchdog assigs roles to data consumers. For example, if a doctor wishes to be given a role of "Cancer researcher", he or she must contact an appropriate watchdog (e.g., a research ethics board) for approval.
• Consent is expressed by a set of rules that specify which role(s) may access an individual's resources.
Next, we describe the required CMS functionality, drawing again from the relevant consent management literature. Note that here the CMS acts as the Data Controller.
(1) Individuals should be able to grant or withdraw consent to data consumers acting in particular roles. Consent specification should be fine-grained: it may depend on the resource, the role, or the time range of the data (see, e.g., [12, 15, 40] ). In practice, some individuals, such as infants, may not be able to give consent, motivating the need to be able to delegate consent to another individual. (2) Watchdogs should be able to assign and revoke data consumers' roles. (3) Given their roles, data consumers should be able to request permission to access data (see, e.g., [21, 40] ). The CMS must determine whether such permission can be granted. (4) A CMS must be tamper-proof and auditable. Individuals should be able to audit who requested (and was granted) access to their data (see, e.g., [22, 40] ). Data consumers should be able to audit the CMS if asked to prove that they have obtained clearance to access data. Table 1 lists the entities participating in consent management in three examples: electronic health records, smart infrastructure, and social media. We describe these applications below.
• Electronic Health Records: Here, patients correspond to individuals. Hospitals and healthcare research organizations generate data using medical equipment (serving as data generators) and store the data in a hospital database (serving as a data store). Doctors and other healthcare staff may be the data consumers; they may require access to personal data for treatment or to carry out research studies. Roles may be assigned to consumers based on their affiliations or occupations. Watchdogs such as research ethics boards may approve or deny roles such as those required to do medical research. Patients may audit the CMS to determine who requested access to their data, while doctors and medical researchers may use the CMS to prove that they requested and obtained permission to access the data. • Smart Infrastructure: With the growth of IoT technologies, governments are setting up smart infrastructure in urban areas. Citizens use public infrastructure, and thus should know if any third party has been given access to their data, and, if possible, should control access to the data. For instance, utility companies, as data consumers in their role as electricity providers, may receive smart meter data for billing. Homeowners may want to share smart meter data with third parties or academic researchers to help reduce their bills. These third parties may be verified by civil society organizations before being granted a role of, e.g., an energy data analyst. Individuals may then audit the CMS to determine who accessed their data and third parties may query the CMS to produce proof that they obtained consent to access the data. • Social Media: Social media applications collect social interaction and behavioural data about their users. They may sell the data to third parties or use the data to serve advertisements. Users should be able to see who accessed their data and manage their consent settings. Individuals are the people using social media applications, and the data may be stored on social media company databases. Company analysts and third parties act as data consumers, and they should only be able to access data after receiving consent from users through the CMS. Privacy advocates serve as watchdogs here.
BLOCKCHAINS FOR CONSENT MANAGEMENT
In this section, we justify the use of a permissioned blockchain for consent management. We also give a high-level overview of Consentio's design, scope and limitations (implementation details follow in Section 4).
Mitigating Trust Issues in Consent Management Systems
First, assume a centralized architecture for private data management, in which the CMS, the data generators and the data store are controlled by the same centralized entity. Figure 1 illustrates such an architecture along with interactions between the participating entities, with solid arrows representing requests made to the CMS and dotted arrows representing the CMS response. In this design, individuals, roles and watchdogs all rely on the controlling entity to give or revoke consent, assign and revoke roles, request access to data, and audit data request histories. As a result, the following trust relationships exist:
(1) Individuals must trust the CMS to keep track of their consent settings, and to only allow authorized roles to obtain access to private data. (2) Individuals must trust the watchdogs to assign and revoke roles to data consumers. (3) Data consumers (assigned particular roles) must trust the CMS to correctly allow or deny access to data. (4) Watchdogs must trust the CMS to assign and revoke data consumers' roles as requested. (5) Data generators must be trusted to produce correct data. (6) The data store must be trusted to release data only to consumers that were approved by the CMS. (7) Furthermore, individuals must trust the CMS not to collude with data consumers to endorse data access without the individuals' consent. (8) Similarly, watchdogs must trust the CMS not to collude with data consumers to endorse data access to unauthorized roles. (9) Finally, data consumers must be trusted not to share any data they obtained with unauthorized parties, and to use the data only for approved purposes.
Blockchain systems are suitable for applications wishing to eliminate a central trusted party [18] , as is the case in the architecture illustrated in Figure 1 . At a high level, a blockchain is a distributed, immutable and tamper-proof transaction log maintained by a network of nodes. Instead of employing a trusted third party to manage the transactions, the blockchain network is responsible for this. To do so, each node in a blockchain system maintains a copy of the log, and a consensus protocol is used to make progress and agree on the state of the log.
In a permissionless blockchain system such as Bitcoin, the network is public and anyone can join anonymously, making consensus difficult. Expensive methods such as Proof of Work are used to decide on the next block of transactions, which are then validated (e.g., to ensure there is no double-spending) by all the participating nodes. In proof of work, each node may independently validate incoming transactions and place them into an ordered block. Nodes then compete to solve a cryptographic puzzle that requires substantial computing resources. These competing nodes are referred to as miners. The first miner that solves the puzzle wins the right to append its proposed next block to the chain, as well as a reward in bitcoin. The winner sends a copy of its block to the other nodes, which again validate the transactions, and sequentially execute and commit them to update their copy of the blockchain.
On the other hand, permissioned blockchain systems are usually jointly owned by a consortium of known participants who may not necessarily trust each other. Here, nodes are not anonymous, and each node must be approved to join the network by a membership service run by the consortium. Thus, if any actor is found to engage in malicious activities, the membership service can take appropriate action. Instead of using proof of work, permissioned systems delegate consensus to a subset (or to all) of the participating nodes that run a byzantine or crash fault tolerant consensus protocol to decide on the next block of transactions. Permissioned systems have been used in a wide range of applications requiring a tamper-proof transaction log, and are usually not backed by a native cryptocurrency.
Permissioned and permissionless systems ensure immutability and tamper resistance via full replication and hash pointers to the previous block stored in the next block (any attempted changes to the blockchain after a new block has been committed invalidate the pointers).
Following recent related work on consent management, we observe that blockchains can mitigate some of the trust issues identified earlier due to the presence of a centralized third party that runs the CMS. Furthermore, as also observed in previous work (details in Section 6), we choose a permissioned blockchain in order to control membership (i.e., to only allow patients, doctors and approved third-party data consumers). Additionally, for auditability, the identities of data consumers must be known.
A critical design element in our solution is to decouple consent management from data management, akin to decoupling the control plane from the data plane in computer networks. places Consentio in this decoupled environment. We define the consent layer, which is the focus of this paper, to include CMS functionality such as granting or withdrawing consent to personal data. In contrast, the data layer includes the data themselves. As shown in the figure, consent is now jointly managed by all parties using Consentio with a blockchain back end, without having to be entrusted to a third party. Individuals can submit transactions to give or withdraw consent for a given role to access a given data resource. Data consumers can request role approval from watchdogs, who can submit the corresponding transactions (to grant or revoke a role for a given consumer). Furthermore, data consumers acting under some role may submit transactions to request access to data. If permission is granted, data consumers may take their proof of consent to the data store to obtain the data (the details of obtaining the data given a proof of consent are orthogonal to this paper and not discussed further). All of these transactions are on the blockchain and therefore are tamper-proof and auditable by all parties.
Given the design in Figure 2 , the following trust issues have been mitigated.
• The CMS cannot collude with data consumers to endorse unauthorized data access. Any requests for data access (if granted) will be on the blockchain, are thus tamper-proof, and may be audited.
• The CMS cannot deny data access to consumers who ought to have access. Again, individuals' consent settings will be on the blockchain, are tamper-proof, and may be verified. • The CMS cannot collude with data consumers to ignore the roles assigned by watchdogs. All role assignments and revocations will be on the blockchain, are tamper-proof, and may be audited.
These situations correspond to trust issues 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8 defined earlier.
(Note that similar trust issues exist in current banking systems: customers must trust the banks to record their transactions properly. On the other hand, in a network such as Bitcoin, the blockchain may be audited to prove that a transaction took place.)
Limitations
A limitation of the general design shown in Figure 2 is that trust issues 2, 5, 6 and 9 remain. That is, data generators must still be trusted to produce correct data; the data store must still be trusted to release data only to consumers that obtained the necessary permission from the CMS; data consumers must still be trusted to not "leak" the data; and watchdogs must still be trusted to assign and revoke roles (e.g., to revoke a "data analyst" role from an analyst who is found to share the data with unauthorized parties). Of these four issues, only the watchdog issue is at the consent layer. However, by definition, watchdogs are usually public organizations, governments or consortia, and therefore have some built-in transparency and can be held accountable by the public. On the other hand, the trust relationships with data generators, data stores and data consumers are at the data layer and therefore outside the scope of this paper (however, we will point out potential solutions to data-layer trust problems in Section 6). In particular, we acknowledge that consent management will not solve data layer issues, but instead sets up a a mechanism to verify whether consent was given. This makes the auditing process faster and cheaper as a watchdog no longer needs to wait or obtain the necessary permits to audit the data.
IMPLEMENTING CONSENTIO IN HYPERLEDGER FABRIC
In this section, we discuss the implementation of Consentio using the Hyperledger Fabric [2] permissioned blockchain system. Our CMS design generalizes those presented in recent work on healthcare and IoT consent management (see, e.g., [3, 31, 39] ). We start with an overview of Fabric, followed by an exploration of possible world state designs for consent management, and implementation details of Consentio.
Overview of Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric [2] is an open-source collaborative project hosted by the Linux Foundation and maintained by IBM. It is a popular and an actively studied permissioned blockchain system [1, 19, 33, 36] . From a data management standpoint, there are two important data structures: the blockchain, which is the transaction log, and the world state, which is a key-value store to maintain some application-defined state information. For concurrency control, the key-value store is versioned, and each key includes a version number of its latest value. Furthermore, from a transaction processing standpoint, there are two important stages: transaction ordering and transaction execution. The nodes in a Fabric cluster are divided into orderers, responsible only for transaction ordering, and peers, each peer maintaining a copy of the blockchain and the world state. Some peers are also endorsers, which are additionally responsible for endorsing client transactions. Figure 3 illustrates the transaction pipeline in Fabric. On the top left, a client begins by sending its transaction to the endorsers (the figure assumes there are three endorsing peers). Each endorser simulates the execution of the transaction (expressed in chaincode, which is Fabric's term for a smart contract) in a sandboxed environment, and records the versions of all keys that were read or written. This read-write set is appended to the transaction, along with the endorser's signature, and returned to the client.
After a client collects the endorsements, it sends its transaction along with the endorsements to the orderer peers. Orderers run some consensus protocol and agree on the order of transactions, which are then segmented into blocks. Next, blocks are sent to all the peers for validation and commitment. Each peer serially executes the transactions and updates its world state, incrementing the version numbers of updated keys. A transaction commits if every key in its read-write set (as computed earlier by the endorsers) still has the same version number. Otherwise, this means that a prior transaction has written a new value to a key touched by the current transaction, and the current transaction aborts. Finally, each peer appends the new block to its copy of the blockchain. Note that blocks may include aborted transactions, which are labelled as such.
For example, suppose the entity with key A submits two transactions: transfer some amount of money from A to entity B, and transfer some amount from A to entity C. The smart contract for such a transaction may check if the sender has sufficient balance to make the transfer, and, if so, update the sender and receiver balances accordingly. Suppose the version numbers of all the keys are currently 100. The read-write set of the first transaction, as computed by the endorsers, is then {A:100, B:100}, indicating the keys and their version numbers. Similarly, the read-write set of the second transaction is {A:100, C:100}. Note that the version number of A is the same for both transactions because they were initially executed in a sandboxed environment by the endorsers, and therefore the writes are not yet committed to the world state. Now suppose the first transaction is ordered before the second one by the ordering service. This means that only the first transaction can be committed in the current block and the second one will abort to prevent potential double-spending: since the second transaction was executed in a sandbox without seeing the effects of the first one, it is not clear if A now has enough money left for the transfer to C. To understand why, observe that the first transaction will write a new value to key A, incrementing its version to 101. When the second transaction is executed by the peers, the current version number of A (101) will not match the version number of A in the second transaction's read-write set computed by the endorsers (100). In this example, the client would have to resubmit the second transaction, which would be re-endorsed with the read-write set of {A:101, C:100}. The second transaction may then be committed in the next block, provided that the version numbers of A and C are not incremented by other transactions included in the next block.
Consentio Transactions
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the implementation details of Consentio in Fabric. First, we explain the transactions. Recall from Section 2 that a CMS deals with individuals (identified by ind_id) and their resources (identified by res_id), data consumers (identified by dc_id) and their roles (identified by role_id), as well as watchdogs (identified by wd_id). To allow fine-grained consent specification, resources are divided into timeframes, with a time unit identified by time_id.
Recall from Section 2 that there are four required CMS functionalities, reiterated below with references to the identifiers of the participating entities.
(1) Consent: An individual (with a given ind_id) may grant or withdraw consent to allow data consumers (with a particular role_id granted by a particular wd_id) to access a fragment of a resource res_id corresponding to time time_id.
To enable fine-grained consent specification, we allow individuals to only allow data access for specific roles approved by specific watchdogs, and to only allow access to selected temporal fragments of the data. While consent can be delegated, we do not record delegation as a transaction on the blockchain due to privacy and legal implications. Instead, we offload delegation to the membership service, which is trusted. Alternatively, we can improve security by using a solution similar to ControlChain [29] , which employs a separate blockhain for delegations. In the remainder of this paper, we assume for simplicity that if individual x controls The CMS (specifically, Fabric endorsers) must identify the ind_ids of individuals who have have allowed role role_id granted by wd_id to have access to the requested fragment of the requested resource. A record of an access request transaction will be written to the blockchain, together with the list of the consenting individual IDs. Note that we do not allow consumers to directly request access to a particular individual's data. (4) Audit: The above transactions must be tamper-proof and auditable. Individuals should be able to audit their consent histories and requests to access their data; consumers should be able to audit their access requests; and watchdogs should be able to audit their role approvals and withdrawals.
In Fabric, transactions are implemented as smart contracts and are recorded in the blockchain. Since Fabric is a permissioned system, all participating individuals, data consumers and watchdogs must be approved by a membership service. In our setting, endorser and peer nodes may be managed by a consortium of watchdogs.
Since each Fabric peer maintains a copy of the blockchain storing the transactions, we envision an off-chain data analytics layer supported by the peers that allows participating parties to audit their transactions. This may be implemented in a tool such as Hyperledger Explorer [11] . We can also offload consent delegation to the membership service, which is responsible for assigning public-private key pairs to all peers. Note that only the participating peers have a copy of the blockchain, not the clients, meaning that clients do not have access to other clients' consent policies on the blockchain. Instead, individuals can submit audit requests to the endorser(s), who in turn can check which data consumers were given access to the individual's data. Furthermore, individuals can contact several random endorsers to audit the data.
Space of World State Designs
The key-value world state is a critical data structure maintained by Fabric to process transactions. In simple financial applications, the world state is straightforward: the key is an account ID and the value is the current balance in that account. Smart contracts that move funds from one account to another must verify that there is enough money in the sender's account, subtract funds from the sender's account, and add funds to the recipient's account. This can be done by reading from and writing to the world state, followed by appending the corresponding transaction to the blockchain; it is not necessary to scan the blockchain (which may be very long) in order to commit a transaction.
In the design of Consentio, the data management challenge is to translate the complex requirements on CMS transactions into a simple key-value world state. We want to ensure high transaction throughput to scale to very large deployments: many individuals, many resources divided into many time units, many data consumers, etc. Additionally, we also want to ensure low latency given Fabric's double-spending prevention that aborts transactions attempting to write to a key that has already been written to by another transaction in the same block. If there are many such conflicting transactions, they must be re-issued in the next block, meaning that it may take many blocks until all such transactions are committed.
To explore the space of world state designs, we observe that the three main entities in consent management are individuals, data (resources), and data consumers (roles); watchdogs also participate in a CMS but there are likely to be fewer watchdogs than individuals and consumers. This suggests three designs, explained below and illustrated in key-value format in Listing 1.
• Role-oriented world state (RoWS) groups similar roles together. A key is a concatenation of resource ID, individual ID, watchdog ID and time ID, and a value is a list of role IDs that were given access to the data specified in the key (i.e., the given time fragment of the given resource of the given individual) and were approved by the given watchdog. • Resource-oriented world state (RWS) groups similar resources together. This design was initially suggested in [13] .
A key is a concatenation of individual ID, role ID, watchdog ID and time ID, and a value is a list of resource IDs for which consent was given as specified in the key (i.e., the given individual has given consent for the particular temporal fragments of the resources to be accessed by the given roles approved by the given watchdogs). • Individual-oriented world state (IWS) groups similar individuals together. A key is a concatenation of resource ID, role ID, watchdog ID and time ID, and a value is a list of individual IDs giving consent to the data specified in the key (i.e., the given temporal fragment of a the given resource being available to the given role approved by the given watchdog).
Listing 1: World state designs in key:value format
Independently of these three designs, the world state also needs to record role information. Listing 2 shows the world state for role assignments and revocations: a key is a triple (role_id, dc_id, wd_id), and the value indicates whether a role was granted or withdrawn. When processing access request transactions, this will allow us to quickly determine if a given data consumer was assigned a given role by a given watchdog. Figure 4 illustrates the differences between RWS, RoWS and IWS in terms of transaction processing. The blue boxes show the transactions and their parameters, and the white boxes show the keyvalue world state for each design (we omit key version numbers for simplicity). We consider two resources, HR and BP; 3 individuals with IDs 1,2 and 3; one role, R1; one data consumer, DC1; one watchdog, W1; and one timeframe, 2017. There are eight transactions executed sequentially. Suppose transactions 1-6 are in different blocks and transaction 7a and 7b are in the same block.
The first three transactions correspond to each of the three individuals giving consent for role R1 approved by watchdog W1 to access the resources HR and BP. In RoWS and RWS, each transaction creates new records in the world state. In IWS, these transactions modify the values of existing keys. Additionally, each transaction (and its input paramters) is recorded on the blockchain.
Note the different number of keys and values in the different world state designs after transaction 3 commits. There are six keys with one value each in RoWS because consent was given to one role for six different resource-individual-timeframe combinations 
There are three keys with two values each in RWS because consent to two resources was given by three different individuals. There are two keys and three values each in IWS because three individuals gave consent to two different resource-role-timeframe combinations. Transaction 4 is a request for access made by data consumer DC1 claiming to have role R1 assigned by watchdog W1. However, this role has not yet been assigned to DC1 by the watchdog. As a result, Consentio would not grant access to the data.
In transaction 5, watchdog W1 assigns role R1 to DC1, resulting in an update of the world state shown in grey (and an insertion of this transaction and its parameters into the blockchain). When consumer DC1 requests access again (transaction 6), its request is now granted by Consentio. In RoWS, all the keys containing watchdog W1, timeframe 2017, and resource BP need to be identified; then, if the corresponding value includes R1, then we know that the corresponding individual granted R1 consent for the requested data item. The process then repeats for resource HR. In RWS, we similarly need to find keys containing W1, R1 and 2017, and whose value includes the requested resources, BP or HR. In IWS, we access one key (if it exists) per resource-timeframe pair: the one with BP, W1, R1 and 2017, and the one with HR, W1, R1 and 2017. We then retrieve the corresponding value (i.e., the list of individual IDs). Below transaction 6, the figure shows the lists of individual IDs that will be included with the transaction on the blockchain depending on the world state design.
Transaction 7a illustrates revocation of consent to one of the two resources by individual 1. This results in the deletion of a key in RoWS or the modification of the value of a key in both RWS and IWS. Finally, in transaction 7b, another access request is made. However, since transactions 7a and 7b are in the same block, transaction 7b would be aborted since the keys it touched during endorsement (before the effects of transaction 7a) overlap with those touched by transaction 7a.
Complexity Analysis
In a real-life deployment of a CMS, there may be many individuals and resources, and the resources may be broken up into many time fragments to allow fine-grained consent (and to insist that data consumers request access to each timeframe of each resource individually). As a result, Consentio needs to scale with the number of transactions, which requires each transaction to be processed efficiently. We now analyze the computational complexity of transactions using different world state designs. We show a summary in Table 2 . In this section, we assume that an access request refers to one particular timeframe of one particular resource.
First, the complexity of a watchdog's assigning or revoking a role is O(1) independently of the world state design. It suffices to check if a key with the given watchdog id, data consumer id and role id exists; we update its value if it exists and we create it otherwise.
Using IWS, transactions to grant or revoke consent and transactions requesting access both have constant-time complexity. If a Figure 4 : Transaction processing using different world state designs data consumer (claiming a particular role assigned by a particular watchdog) wants to access one resource for a single timeframe, then we make two key lookups. The first is to determine if the role claimed by the data consumer was assigned by the given watchdog. The second is to retrieve the value (i.e., the list of consenting individual IDs) corresponding to the key with the requested resource and timeframe, the consumer's role_id, and the watchdog that assigned it. If an individual wants to grant or revoke consent (for one individual, one resource, one timeframe and one role), this requires one key lookup. The lookup is to find the key corresponding to the consent being modified (or create it if it does not exist), and to update the value accordingly. We implement the values (lists of individual IDs) as hashmaps, giving constant-time complexity to add or remove individuals, assuming constant time to serialize and deserialize a hashmap stored as a value in the world state.
Using RWS and RoWS, granting or revoking consent has constant-time complexity. One lookup is required to find the key corresponding to the consent being granted or revoked, and update the value (again, we implement the values as hashmaps, giving constant-time update cost). However, requesting access in RWS and RoWS has linear complexity with the number of individuals since individual ID is part of their keys. For each individual in the system, we can concatenate its individual ID with the parameters contained in the request access transaction, and look up all the corresponding keys. We then return the individual IDs where the corresponding value contained the requesting consumer's role (RWS) or the requested resource (RoWS).
Algorithm 1 Assign/Revoke Role
Input: wd_id,dc_id, role_id,action Output: None 1: procedure ASSIGN/REVOKE ROLE 2: key ← role_id |dc_id|wd_id 3: if action == 'assign' then 4: PUT(key, 'assign') 5: 
Consentio Smart Contracts
Informed by the complexity analysis, we select IWS for Consentio. Furthermore, we expect the number of individuals in a CMS to be higher than the number of resources (e.g., in a healthcare setting, there may be hundreds of thousands of patients but perhaps hundreds of resources). Thus, the number of keys in IWS is expected to be smaller than in the other two designs. The smart contract source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ddhruvkr/Consentio, and we discuss the smart contract pseuducode below.
In the pseudocode, we use the following functions to interact with the key-value world state.
GET(k): returns the value corresponding to key k PUT(k,v): writes value v to key k and increments the version number (or creates a new key with version number 1 if the key does not exist).
DELETE(k):
Deletes key k and its corresponding value. Assign/Revoke Role: Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for this smart contract. It takes a watchdog id (wd_id) data consumer id (dc_id), role id (role_id) and an action (which can be 'assign' or 'revoke') as input. It first constructs the key using the watchdog id, data consumer id and role id (Line 2). If the action is 'assign', it creates an entry in the world state denoting an assignment of a role (Line 3-4). Otherwise, it revokes the role assigned previously by deleting the entry from the world state (Line 5-6).
Grant/Revoke Consent Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode for this smart contract, which allows a consent modification for a set of resources. It first iterates over the set of resources given in the input and assembles keys by concatenating the resource, role, watchdog and the time-period (Line 2-3). It then fetches a list of consenting individuals for each key (Line 4). If the key does not exist and the action is Grant, it creates an entry for this key and stores the individual id (Line 5-6). If an entry already exists and if the action is Revoke, it updates the value by deleting the individual id from the list (Line 7-9). If the action is Grant and the individual id does not exist in the value, the individual id is added (Line 10-11). Finally, the world state is updated with the new value (Line 12).
The Request Access smart contract pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 3. It allows a data consumer to specify a list of resources it wants to access. For each requested resource, the smart contract returns a list of consenting individuals. First, it checks whether the data consumer was assigned a role by the specified watchdog to access the requested resources (Line 2-4). For each resource in the input (Line 6), a key is generated with the concatenation of resource, watchdog, role, and time (Line 7). Next, a list of consenting individual ids is returned (Line 8) and, if not empty, added to the output (Line 9-10). Finally, the lists of consenting individual IDs for each requested resource are returned (Line 13).
Algorithm 2 Grant/Revoke Consent
Input: ind_id, role_id, wd_id, time_id, resourceList, action 1: procedure GRANT/REVOKE CONSENT 2: for resource ∈ resourceList do 3: key ← resource|wd_id |role_id|time_id 4: id List ← GET(key) 5: if idList == ∅ and( action == 'Grant') then 6: idList ← [ind_id] 7: if idList ∅ then 8: if ind _id ∈ idList and action == 'Revoke' then 9:
idList ← idList − ind_id 10: if ind_id idList and action == 'Grant' then 11: idList ← idList ∪ ind_id 12: PUT(key, idList) for resource ∈ ResourceList do 7:
key ← resource|wd_id |role_id|time_id 8: id List ← GET(key) 9: if id List ∅ then if r esul t == ∅ then 12: return NULL 13: return result
Latency Implications
Due to Fabric's double spending prevention, transactions accessing the same key (with at least one transaction writing a new value) are said to conflict, and only one of them can be committed in a single block. This increases latency since the conflicting transactions must be re-issued and re-endorsed in subsequent blocks. If there are k conflicting transactions in one block, it will take k blocks to commit all of them, one per block. Since our three world state designs have different keys, they also induce different transaction collisions.
In RoWS and RWS, request access transactions are likely to conflict with consent modification transaction because the former are likely to touch many keys, perhaps including the keys being modified by the latter. This is not the case in IWS, where an access request transaction touches only one key. As long as that key is not being modified by another transaction, there is no conflict. Furthermore, regardless of the world state design, access request transactions never conflict with each other because they do not write to the world state (more precisely, they do not modify the version number of any key), only the to blockchain.
However, consent management transactions for different individuals may conflict with each other only in IWS (because in the other two designs, individual ID is part of the key). As a consequence, multiple individuals cannot add or revoke consent for the same resource, same timeframe, same role and same watchdog in a single block. This may be a problem if multiple individuals wish to revoke consent for a misbehaving role as soon as possible. However, since roles are approved and withdrawn by watchdogs, it may make more sense for watchdogs to handle such cases. Regardless of the world state design, watchdog transactions do not conflict with any other transactions since they use a separate key space. Thus, watchdogs can immediately revoke a role, and the end result is the same as if all the individuals had revoked all of their consent for that role, one resource-timeframe pair at a time.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally evaluate Consentio through micro-benchmarking and a comparison of the IWS world state design to RWS (we omit results using RoWS, which, despite the same worst-case complexity as RWS, was less efficient due to its larger key space if there are fewer roles than resources). For the Fabric cluster, we use five local servers connected by a 1 Gbit/s switch. Each server is equipped with two Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 v2 processors at 2.10 GHz, and 64 GB of RAM. We use a single endorser, orderer, peer, and four clients. We use GO to implement smart contracts and use FastFabric [19] as the underlying permissioned blockchain (FastFabric is a recent modification of Fabric that improves transaction throughput without changing the fundamental architecture or the API).
The experiments focus on transaction throughput. We generate non-conflicting transactions that proceed through the entire transaction pipeline without being aborted. Thus, we evaluate the maximum capacity of the pipeline, keeping in mind that conflicting transactions reduce throughput and increase latency.
We do not measure endorsement time since our focus in this paper is on speeding up transaction commitment through a suitable world state design. Additionally, we can easily scale out the endorsers for higher endorsement throughput. Thus, we send pre-endorsed transactions to the orderer, which groups them into blocks and sends the blocks to the committer. The committer validates and commits changes to its world state, and sends validated blocks to the endorsers. We set up 25 threads within each client (totalling 100 threads) that send transactions to the orderer and monitor the time it takes to send 100,000 transactions. Following prior work that has done a detailed micro-benchmarking of FastFabric [19] , we set the block size to 100.
Recall from Section 4 that in our context, a data consumer's request to access a resource only reads from the world state: it suffices to read the consent information captured in the world state to decide whether to grant or reject the request. On the other hand, when an individual modifies their consent settings (or when watchdogs update roles), the world state is also modified.
Micro-Benchmarking of IWS World State
Effect of world state size: First, we vary the number of keys in the world state from 20,000 to 1,000,000, and we set the value size per key (i.e., the number of individual IDs) and keys touched per transaction to 100. In this experiment, we only perform world state reads (i.e., GET requests). Figure 5 shows the transaction throughput. Next, as shown in Figure 6 , we keep the keyspace fixed at 20,000 and keys touched per transaction at 100, and we increase the value space, i.e., the number of individual IDs per key, from 1 to 10,000. Again, we only perform GET requests. Finally, in Figure 7 we show how the write throughput (i.e., PUT requests) of the world state changes by increasing the value space. We fix keys touched per transaction at 100 and the key space at 20,000. We conclude that as long as the world state fits in memory, which is the case in these experiments, throughput is not significantly affected by the number of keys or the value size per key. Effect of transaction size: Next, we experiment with read transactions touching different numbers of keys: from 1 to 3,000. Figure 8 shows the results; recall that we report committer throughput, with endorsement time removed (i.e., pre-endorsed transaction throughput), which helps us to zoom in on committer performance. We observe that a single endorser cannot keep up when each transaction touches close to 1000 keys (more keys per transaction means more accesses to the world state per transaction during endorsement). At this point, to scale out the system, we add another endorser. Having two endorsers allows us to keep up with transactions touching up to 2500 keys. However, regardless of the number of endorsers, throughput decreases as transaction size increases since large transactions perform more accesses into the world state during commitment (meaning that now, the committer becomes the bottleneck, not the endorsers). Furthermore, for small transaction sizes, adding a second endorser does not increase (and even slightly decreases) throughput. We believe that the slight decrease is due to experimental noise as there is no systematic problem with scaling out the endorsers.
IWS vs. RWS Design
We now compare the RWS world state design suggested in [13] with the IWS world state design we use in Consentio. We construct four workloads of access requests. We vary the number of individuals and resources in the world state. Table 3 shows the results, one row per workload (note that the number of keys and keys touched per transaction in a given workload is different for RWS and IWS). We conclude that Consentio has higher throughput in all tested scenarios. The throughput of IWS remains constant as the workload parameters vary, whereas RWS overloads when the number of individuals is large. This is because requests to access data in RWS correspond to complex transactions that touch many keys, as explained in Section 4.5. Even when the number of resources is large, IWS performs better than RWS. Table 4 summarizes the previous work on blockchains for consent management along the following three axes, and the remainder of this section discusses the work in detail.
RELATED WORK
• Domain Agnostic: Is the system designed for a single domain/application area or for multiple domains? • Performance Oriented: Is the architecture optimized for performance? • Implementation Details (Replicability): Are there enough details to implement the proposed solution?
We begin with prior work that used permissionless blockchains. The authors of [27] manage and enforce access control policies on a Bitcoin-like blockchain. The blockchain stores the IDs of the participants who hold access rights and the set of associated permissions. As with cryptocurrency, a user can transfer their access rights to another user. However, they do not provide a smart contract implementation to evaluate and enforce consent policies. Zyskind et al. [40] combine a permissionless blockchain, repurposed as an access control moderator, with an off-blockchain storage solution for consent in mobile applications. Users are not required to trust a third party and can find out who accessed their data. However, implementation details were not discussed.
The authors in [31, 39] , and [3] present consent management systems, with some implementation details, for specific domains. Zhang et al. [39] provide access control for subject-object pairs in the Internet of Things (IoT). Access control contracts perform static access right validation based on predefined policies and dynamic access right validation by checking the behaviour of the individual to whom access is given. They provide a proof-of-concept implementation and implement smart contracts in Ethereum [7] , a permissionless Blockchain. Rantos et al. [31] provide a GDPRcompliant, Ethereum based framework for managing data from IoT devices. They propose an Intelligent Policy Access Mechanism (IPAM) to analyze consent policies, detect inconsistencies, and group similar policies together. Azaria et al. [3] give patients access to their medical information across providers and treatment sites. They use Ethereum to manage authentication, confidentiality, accountability and data sharing. They associate a medical record with viewing permissions and data retrieval queries (in SQL) for execution on external databases. However, they focus on giving patients access to their medical histories rather than general consent management. Boiani in [6] inspect fabric based EHR consent management under emergency situations where a part of the network may be down.
The authors in [16, 25] , and [12] use permissioned blockchains for consent management. The authors in [16] discuss a Hyperledger-based CMS, but do not provide any design or implementation details. Liang et al. [25] propose to use Fabric channels between individuals and requesters to share data. Again, they do not provide any implementation details. The authors in [12] propose to use a consortium blockchain for consent management and access control, with the blockchain serving as a repository for access policies. However, their design does not consider the granularity of data access, lacks implementation details, and only consider Electronic Health Records.
Dubovitskaya et al. [13] design a system for the medical domain and suggest having a national data store that collects patient data on the cloud. A membership service defines the roles of the actors (doctors and patients). Finally, Hyperledger Fabric executes smart contracts requesting data access. However, they assume that only doctors can access patient data, they do not discuss data granularity to which access is granted, and they do not discuss smart contract details. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, their proposed world state design (RWS) has transaction throughput than our design.
In summary, as shown in Table 4 , to the best of our knowledge, Consentio is the only blockchain-based CMS that is domainagnostic, fully implemented, and demonstrated to perform well.
While we focus on the consent layer, we briefly discuss work on mitigating trust issues in the data layer resulting from the distribution of private data. A recent personal data store (PDS) framework called Open-PDS [10] includes a mechanism for returning computations on the data instead of the raw data. There are efforts to tackle the problem from a legislative standpoint [9] . From a security perspective, researchers have developed data anonymization methods such k-anonymity [34] , and its extensions l-diversity [26] and t-closeness [24] , to protect personal information. Differential Privacy [14] , on the other hand, relies on perturbing the data or adding noise before sharing the data. Finally, there has been some work on encryption schemes that enable running computations and queries over encrypted data [17] .
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented Consentio, a general consent management system using a permissioned blockchain back end: Hyperledger Fabric. Using a blockchain allowed us to eliminate the need for a trusted third party to maintain consent settings and transactions. We showed that our solution can be applied to a variety of use cases (Section 2). An important feature of our solution is that it does not require any modifications to Fabric. To preserve compatibility with Fabric, the main technical challenge we addressed was to ensure high throughput and low latency of consent transactions given Fabric's key-value world state. We analyzed the space of possible world state designs and showed that an efficient world state for consent management can be implemented using Fabric's key-value store (Section 4). Finally, experimental results showed that Consentio can handle as many as 6,000 access request per second running on a modest Fabric cluster (Section 5).
In this paper, we focused on the world state design to process consent transactions (i.e., from the Fabric endorser perspective). An interesting direction for future work on Consentio is to develop an efficient data analytics layer for auditing the blockchain.
